Family Law News

Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

The Supreme Court of Canada Recognizes a New Tort

On May 15, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) released its long-awaited decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, creating the new tort of intimate partner violence.[1] This landmark decision will have a profound impact on family law claims across Canada. For many survivors of intimate partner violence, the decision finally recognizes the insidious nature of coercive and controlling behaviour and provides a pathway to seek meaningful compensation for the harms they have suffered. This post provides an overview of the new tort of intimate partner violence and explains the types of abusive conduct that may give rise to a claim.

Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence in Canada

Before discussing the new tort, it is important to understand the broader context of intimate partner violence in Canada and the historic shortcomings of the law in addressing this form of abuse. Statistics Canada reported that in 2024 alone, police recorded 128,175 victims of intimate partner violence.[2] These figures do not account for incidents that went unreported.  Intimate partner violence remains significantly underreported. Women and girls were affected at rates more than three and a half times higher than men and boys.[3] This is not to suggest that women are the only victims of intimate partner violence. The SCC emphasized that women’s experiences of inequality and loss of autonomy help explain the coercive nature of this form of violence, but the principles underlying the tort apply to all intimate partners facing similar vulnerabilities.[4] The SCC acknowledged the pervasive nature of intimate partner violence in Canada and confirmed the broad legal and societal consensus that this conduct must be condemned.[5]

Why the New Tort Was Needed

The SCC recognized the new tort in response to a significant gap in the law. Family law claims generally arise from two sources:

  1. Legislation, which consists of laws enacted by Parliament or provincial legislatures; and
  2. The common law, which develops through judicial decisions.

No family law legislation in Canada currently allows survivors of intimate partner violence to seek compensation specifically for the violence they endured. In fact, the Divorce Act expressly prohibits courts from considering misconduct when determining spousal support.[6] In Ontario, property division is governed by the Family Law Act (“FLA”), which generally assumes spouses are entitled to an equal division of family property at the end of a relationship.[7] While section 5(6) of the FLA allows unequal division in limited circumstances, intimate partner violence is not specifically included among them.[8]

Tort Claims Before Ahluwalia

Prior to Ahluwalia, survivors seeking compensation for abuse generally relied on traditional tort claims such as assault, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims remain available and continue to serve an important role in family law litigation. However, coercive and controlling violence often involves a broader pattern of conduct that does not fit neatly within the confines of these traditional torts. For example, a single physical assault may ground a claim in battery. But the broader context of the relationship may reveal an ongoing pattern of domination, intimidation, financial control, isolation, stalking, or psychological abuse designed to undermine the victim’s autonomy and equality within the relationship. As Justice Kasirer stated on behalf of the majority in Ahluwalia:

“The intimate partner is not simply seeking compensation for the physical and psychological bruises that are recognized by existing torts; in effect, they are alleging ‘I am not just a bruised spouse, I am an unfree spouse.’”[9]

The new tort addresses this broader pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour.

The Legal Test for the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

The SCC established three elements that must be proven to succeed in a claim for intimate partner violence:

  1. The abusive conduct arose within an intimate partnership or its aftermath;
  2. The defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct; and
  3. The conduct objectively constituted coercive control.[10]

Each element is discussed below.

1) Abusive Conduct Must Arise Within an Intimate Partnership

The first element distinguishes intimate partner violence from violence involving other family relationships. The SCC described an intimate partnership as:

“a relationship of close personal connection, sustained over a period of time, and marked by mutual interdependence, care or commitment, and the presence of domestic, emotional, financial or physical intimacy.”[11]

The relationship does not need to involve marriage, cohabitation, or even sexual relations. However, it must involve a degree of intimacy and personal interdependence. Importantly, the SCC confirmed that coercive and controlling behaviour occurring after separation may also ground a claim. Post-separation abuse may include:

  • Litigation abuse
  • Financial abuse
  • Harassment or stalking
  • Psychological intimidation
  • Attempts to manipulate or weaponize legal proceedings

The Court emphasized that family law litigation itself must not become a tool for continued victimization.[12]

2) The Defendant Must Intentionally Engage in the Conduct

The second element does not require proof that the defendant intended to subjectively exert coercive control over their partner or that they intended to cause a specific harm. Instead, the plaintiff need only establish that the defendant intentionally engaged in the abusive conduct itself.[13]

3) The Conduct Must Objectively Constitute Coercive Control

The SCC described coercive and controlling behaviour as “the most serious type of violence in the family law context.”[14]  The Court also recognized coercive control as a significant risk factor for future violence and femicide. The SCC declined to provide an exhaustive definition of coercive control but identified several examples of conduct that may demonstrate it, including:

  • Physical, psychological, emotional, or sexual abuse
  • Financial control
  • Monitoring activities or stalking
  • Threats or intimidation
  • Isolation from friends and family
  • Litigation abuse
  • Preventing employment or educational opportunities
  • False allegations to police or employers

Many of these actions may not independently constitute tortious conduct. However, when viewed collectively, they may form a pattern of domination and subordination that deprives the victim of dignity, autonomy, and equality within the relationship. The SCC emphasized that coercive control is not limited to extreme physical violence. A pattern of conduct that systematically undermines a partner’s freedom and independence may be sufficient.

What Does Not Constitute Coercive Control?

The SCC also clarified that not every unhealthy or dysfunctional relationship involves coercive control. Examples of conduct that would generally not meet the legal threshold include:

  • Dishonesty
  • Infidelity
  • Emotional neglect
  • Ordinary disagreements
  • Cold or dismissive behaviour
  • General antagonism or hostility[15]

While these behaviours may be hurtful, they do not necessarily amount to coercive and controlling violence.

The Objective Standard

Courts must assess coercive control using an objective standard. The question is whether a reasonable person, fully aware of the context of the relationship, would view the conduct as coercive and controlling.  Put another way, has the defendant’s conduct objectively undermined the survivor’s ability to make fundamental decisions pertaining to their own life or to meaningfully participate in decision making that concerns the intimate partnership?

The SCC explained that coercive control involves “breaking down a victim’s will” such that the victim loses meaningful decision-making power within the relationship.[16]

A person living under coercive control may no longer feel free to:

  • Pursue education or employment
  • Maintain relationships with family and friends
  • Make independent financial decisions
  • Exercise personal autonomy

Importantly, the Court confirmed that survivors do not need to demonstrate a complete loss of autonomy. Survivors may resist, leave, or even return to the relationship while still experiencing coercive control.[17]

Limitation Periods: Who Can Bring a Claim?

In Ontario, most civil claims must generally be commenced within two years of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002.[18] However, there are important exceptions for sexual assault or assault claims involving intimate relationships or dependency.[19] Because the tort of intimate partner violence is newly recognized, it remains unclear whether Ontario’s limitation legislation will be amended specifically to address these claims. Given the recency of the Ahluwalia decision, limitation issues may become an important area of future litigation. Survivors who believe they may have a claim should seek legal advice promptly.

Final Thoughts

The SCC’s decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia marks a significant evolution in Canadian family law. By recognizing the tort of intimate partner violence, the Court acknowledged that abuse within intimate relationships often extends far beyond isolated incidents of physical violence. The decision recognizes the devastating effects of coercive and controlling behaviour and provides survivors with a legal framework to seek accountability and compensation for those harms. If you are experiencing intimate partner violence or believe you may have a claim arising from coercive and controlling behaviour, it is important to obtain legal advice as early as possible.

Footnote

[1] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16

[2] Ibid., supra note 1 at para 290 citing Statistics Canada, “Family violence in Canada: A statistical profile, 2024” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2025).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. at para 20

[5] Ibid. at para 100

[6] Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 15.2(5).

[7] Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 5.

[8] Ibid. s. 5(6).

[9] Ahluwalia, supra note 1 at 17

[10] Ibid. at para 5

[11] Ibid. at para 102

[12] Ibid. at para 107

[13] Ibid. at para 186.

[14]  Ibid. at para 119

[15] Ibid. at para 121.

[16] Ibid. at para 198.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, Sch B, s 4.

[19] Ibid. s. 16.

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